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Abstract 
 
Assessing a firm’s corporate governance is an integral part of an equity valuation; however it is 
gradually becoming less and less of the process. A large separation between shareholders and 
manager has formed – each with distinctly different motivations. It is our belief that Democracy 
firms (corporations with motivations aligned with shareholders) should outperform Dictator 
firms (corporations with motivations aligned with management) in the long-run in Canada. Our 
results do not demonstrate statistical significance regarding our hypothesis; nonetheless, we 
caution investors who are enthusiastic about investing in firms who knowingly express their 
motivations away from their investors.  
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Introduction 
 
Corporate Governance has generally been a forgotten metric when looking at valuations 
of public equities. During the 1980’s, a large fundamental change to corporate America enabled 
what were once idle acquisition markets turn into a time where management not only had to 
be concerned with daily operations, but whether their assets were being bid in a hostile 
takeover. It can be argued it was at this moment that the division between principals 
(shareholders) and agents (management) became overwhelmingly clear. For some 
corporations, corporate governance became a tool to protect existing management from being 
replaced, instead of a mechanism to maximize shareholder value.  
The division between management and corporations has continued to widen during the 
1990's and into the first decade of the 21st century. Management has become increasingly 
particular in how their legacy is going to be protected, without signalling to shareholders that 
this is their primary motivation. In academic literature, a large amount of research has been 
conducted to attempt to unfold management's motivations. While researching motivations, the 
primary underlying concern was - what will happen to the stock price? A large portion of the 
academic research has been conducted on American markets; therefore we felt it was 
appropriate to add depth to the Canadian research.  The results for Canada and the United 
States are mixed regarding governance as a driver for stock returns. 
Underestimating the role of governance has been a negative trend in security 
valuations. Generally, governance does not make public headlines unless devastating 
performance is the direct result of an imperfect governance structure. In the American setting, 
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the case of Enron has acted as a stimulus to revisit transparency and prudency in governance. 
The same can be said of the Nortel case in Canada. The point to be made is that by investing in 
one of these two companies, or one of similar deceit, a shareholder would lose everything 
invested – regardless of when the position was purchased. Valuations of quantitative factors 
may have looked impressive or at least on par to its peers; however by analyzing corporate 
governance, it is our belief that some portion of the losses could of have been avoided. We 
confess, that we have the benefit of hindsight in our favour, however, similar to how equity 
valuations use historical information to forecast relevant variables, the same can be done with 
corporate governance. 
We make the argument that by analyzing corporate governance and reserving a value 
for it, a shareholder can generate greater returns in the long-run. Utilizing the concepts of 
Capital Asset Pricing Model, a corporation that knowingly places management’s value ahead of 
shareholder’s value needs to prepare to deliver a higher expected rate of return, given that it is 
a riskier investment because shareholders do not maintain control. It is with this idea in mind 
we research corporate governance in Canada and attempt to find if it is a catalyst for stock 
returns. 
Literature Review 
The initial motivation for our topic on corporate governance came from the year spent 
analyzing various securities during our graduate studies. The idea became a functioning project 
after looking at a paper done by three researchers, who performed a similar analysis for US 
markets. The precedent paper Corporate Governance and Equity Prices, Gompers, Ishii, Metrick 
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2003, concluded that corporations that implemented governance tactics that were aligned with 
shareholders, rather than management, out-performed the latter by 8.5% per year. They 
separated approximately 1,500 American stocks, from September 1990 to December 1999, into 
deciles and focused on the bottom and top groups. The bottom group (Democracy 
corporations)1 represented the lowest index score, but most in line with shareholder’s value. 
The top group (Dictator corporations) represented the highest index score, but most in line with 
management’s benefit.  
Most research on the effects of acquisitions use an event-study approach.2 Looking at 
stock returns before and after a major announcement would only marginally help explain the 
relationship between corporate governance and returns. Correspondingly, Gompers et al. 
resolve this issue by using a long-term investment horizon –‘long-run event study’. Utilizing the 
entire 1990’s decade, and creating their own Governance Index, the full-effects of the principal-
agent paradigm can be analyzed to determine what is better for stock returns.  
Gompers et al. built their Governance Index by gathering data on 24 distinct parameters 
from the Investor Responsibility Research Centre (IRRC). The parameters were further sub-
indexed into 5 groups (Delay, Voting, Protection, Other, State). Each parameter represented a 
‘dummy’ variable, whereby 1 point was given to a parameter if it favoured management’s 
goals; conversely 0 points if it favoured shareholders. By using the ‘all-or-nothing’ approach the 
Index was built with minimized subjectivity. In most cases, the parameter would be clearly 
aligned with one party, and left little ambiguity towards which side of the spectrum it related 
                                                          
1
 Note that in our study, our index has the lowest score relating to the Democracy group and highest score for the 
Dictator group. 
2
 Bhagat and Romano [2001], Bittlingmayer [2000], Comment and Schwert [1995], and Karpoff and Malatesta 
[1989] 
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too. The downfall in ‘all-or-nothing’ is that the actual strength in relation to where it lies on the 
spectrum is not considered. Therefore, all parameters are deemed equally weighted regardless 
of whether they lie in a more neutral territory or on the extreme ends. For the purpose of 
Gompers et al. and our study, it is believed that minimizing the subjective nature by not 
determining the actual strength of the parameters far outweighs the merits of calculating this 
value.  
Gompers et al. used regression analysis to determine if there are correlations between 
their Index and individual firm characteristics. Determining if managements employ certain 
characteristics to reach short-term performance measures is important to supplement their 
tactics with governance strategies. The individual firm characteristics regressed were: book-to-
market ratio, firm size, share price, monthly trading volume, Tobin’s Q, dividend yield, S&P 
inclusion3, past five-year stock return, past 5-year sales growth, and percentage of institutional 
ownership. Gompers et al. found that their Index was positively correlated with size, share 
price, trading volume and institutional ownership4. Further, they found that the 5 year sales 
growth and stock market performance were negatively correlated with the Index.  
Corporate Governance research on the effect of performance runs deeper than 
Gompers et al. Research demonstrating a consistent positive relationship between excess 
returns and governance aligned with shareholders is unheard of. While the previous study has 
conclusive results, Black [2001] argues that there is not a decisive relationship – at least for US 
                                                          
3
 Not all firm studied were part of the S&P 500. Some were from the American Stock Exchange (AMEX) and the 
NASDAQ markets. 
4
 Gompers, Ishii, & Metrick [2003] 
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stocks. Further Klein, Shapiro and Young [2004] find mixed results regarding governance in 
Canada.  
The Klein et al. study resembles that of Gompers’ due to the similar findings between 
family-owned businesses and the Dictatorship group. Both demonstrate a relationship between 
shareholders aligned governance and excess returns. While the relationship regarding family 
owned businesses is not statistically significant, Klein et al. argue that investors should be put 
on alert for these types of situations. Further, similarities between the two studies extend to 
the idea of firm specific characteristics influence over returns. Trying to bridge the separation 
between principals and agents is done by situating competitive wages for managers, prudency 
with disclosure and shareholder’s rights. Investing in this mindset correlates with higher 
returns.  
In similar context, La Porta et al. [1999] deal with the choice between widely and not-
widely dispersed ownership. The similarity stops there as the optimal choice in regards to 
governance-returns is with non-widely dispersed firms. Concentration amongst only a few 
owners make it nimble to act to changes in the market. Additionally, family owners, or those 
handful in control, can exercise their influence over the majority.5   
The diversity of opinions regarding this topic is challenging. Statistically significant data 
is difficult to find across all studies. Supplementary, being submersed in the data, the big 
picture is lost. Rational investors will obviously want to have strong rights, complete disclosure 
from management and long-term shareholder value at the forefront of management’s agenda. 
For our study it is this thought that needs to be otherwise proven wrong. Rational investing as 
                                                          
5
 Majority does not necessarily mean in voting terms, but rather a vast number of minority shareholders. 
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an assumption is basic and mandatory for all economic analysis. Therefore, when data suggests 
a compromise to this assumption – the results need to be not taken for full value. For example, 
intuitively investors would be reluctant to invest in a firm, knowingly that a board is not 
independent but rather built around senior management. However, Klein et al. find that 
independence is not “valued as governance mechanisms” across all ownership structures. 
However, they do find a negative correlation between family owned firms and board 
independence.  
Bebchuk, Cohen & Ferrell [2005] generate a trading strategy such that they would 
purchase a sub-group of firms that have low Index (strong shareholder rights) and jointly short 
sell a sub-group of high scoring firms. The strategy proved to be robust in all 72 sub-periods of 
two or more years from 1990 - 2003. An approximate abnormal return of 7% is dignified with 
statistical significance. The point to be made is that while many studies when combined leave 
corporate governance as an ambiguous performance driver; rational trading strategies amongst 
two divided sub-groups can generate alpha. The individualistic reasoning behind the alpha may 
not be known with statistical significance; nonetheless it is difficult to argue with a strategy that 
was robust in all economic cycles.   
Capital market finance has argued that returns need to be measured on a risk-adjusted 
basis. Further, applying the ideology of the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) mean-variance 
approach to an investment, it is not rationale to invest in a riskier asset, holding all else 
constant, if the riskier asset is returning the same or worse. If you think of a corporation that 
has their interests more aligned with management than with shareholders; the standard 
deviation of their returns may not necessarily indicate risky behaviour; however a rational 
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investor would see through this even without the risk being captured in a standardized format. 
The empirical data may say otherwise, but stepping back once again to gain composure on the 
situation, this type of investment resembles that of an illiquid asset. Calculating standardized 
risk measurements for an illiquid asset can be very challenging, because it is not marked-to-
market frequently; therefore the total risk may not be completely revealed. While the risky 
asset may be liquid and readably convertible to cash; the resemblance lies within the unique 
obstacle between the investor and their optimal returns and the investor's need to be 
compensated for that obstacle. By looking at corporate governance in this manner, an investor 
is more easily able to optimize returns. If a security has similar characteristics to those in the 
Dictator group, investors should demand a higher expected return, similar to any other risky 
assets, for holding that risk.   
 Masulis, Wang and Xie [2006] find that empire building – a set of acquisitions that 
generally are not aligned with shareholder’s interest, but rather lead to personal benefit of 
management are more likely to occur with corporations that have higher anti-takeover 
provisions (ATPs). Correspondingly, the higher agency costs result in lower abnormal returns. 
Masulis et al. find with statistical and economic significance that once Dictator firms6 make an 
“acquisition announcement, *they+ generate lower abnormal bidder returns than those made 
by [Democracy] firms.”  Masulis et al. go deeper than we do into the reasoning behind ‘good or 
bad’ governance by looking in terms of takeover defences. The significance of this literature to 
our idea is that by knowingly investing in an asset with ‘bad’ governance - you would want a 
higher expected return. You as the investor are giving up control and in lieu want the 
                                                          
6
 Masulis, Wang and Xie do not use this term, but we make the case to characterize firms with a high level of ATPS 
as Dictators to simplify all of the sub-groups from other studies. 
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compensation. If empirical data, such as Masulis et al., demonstrate the reverse in terms of 
expected returns, then a rational investor would avoid ‘bad’ governance firms. However, this is 
not the case. Public exchanges trade these types of assets daily, therefore the only plausible 
idea that logically makes sense is that investors are not looking at corporate governance as one 
of their primary valuation metrics. In reality, do everyday investors really care about corporate 
governance? Looking into literature regarding asset valuation concludes that corporate 
governance is not likely to be one of the key metrics in buying or selling. Unless something is 
compellingly obvious, for example a negative portrayal in the media, it is quite possible the 
reasoning behind the balance of power shift towards management is that investors are not 
paying attention. One argument against our idea about receiving additional expected returns 
for taking on the risk for the Dictator securities would be a sell-off trend in these securities 
because of the risk-return relationship. Under these circumstances, efficient market literature 
would tell us that mispricing in securities would lead to a ‘bidding up’ rally until some form of 
market equilibrium is reached. This argument falls short due to the empirical data found in at 
least two studies mentioned so far – trading a long Democracy portfolio is robust in all periods. 
From this, we argue that a rational investor should stay away. 
 Based upon the review of the literature, it appears that corporate governance has mixed 
results. Like most topics, for every pro-argument, there will be an off-setting study. However, 
underlying all of this is that there has been a perverse change in how companies are managed. 
The division between shareholders and management has never been so clear. The mixed results 
can lead to the argument that, maybe researchers are trying to find a pattern when there really 
is no pattern at all. However, what we can defend is that a rational investor should know what 
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they are getting when they buy a trade ticket. If they knowingly buy a security, when 
management intentions are from within, they ought to be compensated for this incurred extra 
risk. Empirical data, from our point of view, correlates to extra reward for buying Democracy 
securities. Therefore, we believe, companies with management’s interest in the forefront 
should be avoided. 
Hypotheses 
The first hypothesis we want to test is Hypothesis 1 found in Gompers et al. [2003] but 
using Canadian data. 
Hypothesis 1 – Governance provisions7 cause higher agency costs 
Predicting that lower corporate governance firms (Dictator) have higher agency costs8, we are 
implying that they should as well have lower abnormal returns when compared with higher 
corporate governance firms (Democracy). Gompers et al. [2003] found that higher agency costs 
would affect lower performance. 
The second hypothesis relates to how firm value is affected by corporate governance. 
Firm value, as measured by Tobin’s Q, should be highly – positively correlated to abnormal 
returns.  
Hypothesis 2 – Large amounts of governance provisions cause lower firm value 
                                                          
7
 Corporate Governance measures not conducive to maximizing shareholder wealth. 
8
 Externalities from not having the shareholder and management’s motivations aligned. 
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Therefore, we predict that the Dictator group will have a lower firm value when compared with 
the Democracy Group. Gompers et al. [2003] found that an increase in the amount of 
governance provisions would cause lower firm value. 
 The third hypothesis is that in the short-run (defined by less than a year) corporate 
governance does not have enough time to impact performance. However, in the long-run we 
would expect to see the first two hypothesises hold.  
Hypothesis 3 – Large amounts of governance provisions effect returns in the long-run 
 The last hypothesis we do not directly test but have chose to include it as part of the 
third hypothesis - we predict that on a risk basis that the Dictator group is riskier because an 
investor is giving up control. Therefore, for an optimal portfolio, if expected excess returns 
above the Democracy portfolio are not achieved then a rational investor would not allocate 
capital towards the group, unless on an individual basis there is an undervalued asset. By using 
the data collected from Hypothesis 3, we can determine the expected returns from both 
groups. 
Data 
In order to rank the stocks found on the Toronto Stock Exchange, we used the corporate 
governance index found on Bloomberg L.P. Institutional Shareholders Services Inc. (ISS). ISS 
ranks publicly traded companies based on the Corporate Governance Quotient (CGQ) Index – a 
relative based ranking system ranging 0.1 – 100. Employing a relative index removes a bias 
towards determining the actual strength of the governance rating. For example: company A 
who has the highest possible rating of a 100 is not 50 points higher than company B, but rather 
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is merely ranked higher. CGQ has become the industry norm in reporting corporate governance 
rankings for valuations and risk measurements. It utilizes a weighted average relative ranking 
for two distinct sub-groups – industry peers and the total index (in our case the Toronto Stock 
Exchange). Each Canadian firm is rated on four core categories, with its aggregate score being a 
weighted average of the category scores: board structure and composition (40%); executive 
and director compensation (30%); audit issues (10%); and anti-takeover provisions (20%).  
Arguments against the subjective use of a weighted average approach for the index are 
appropriate, however to simplify the analytical process we maintained the weights as given.  
Separating into sub-groups of 10 (deciles) helps to determine the top and bottom 10% 
of the sample. The benefits of not performing subjective tests to determine absolute scores, we 
believe out-weigh the value-added from determining these calculations. Summary statistics for 
the construction of the ten portfolios are listed in Table 1.  
Table 1 - Summary Statistics for Corporate Governance Portfolios 
Firms per Portfolio 
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Oct Jan Apr Jul Oct Jan Apr Jul Oct Jan Apr Jul Oct Jan Apr Jul 
1) Dictatorship 16 16 17 17 17 16 16 16 15 14 13 13 17 17 16 15 
2) 16 16 17 17 17 16 16 16 15 14 13 13 17 17 15 15 
3) 16 16 17 17 15 16 16 15 15 14 13 13 17 16 15 15 
4) 16 15 17 17 16 16 16 15 14 13 13 13 16 16 15 15 
5) 15 15 16 16 16 15 15 15 13 12 13 12 16 16 15 14 
6) 15 15 16 17 16 15 15 15 14 13 13 12 16 16 15 14 
7) 15 15 17 17 16 15 15 15 15 13 13 13 17 16 15 15 
8) 16 16 17 17 16 16 16 15 15 14 13 13 17 16 15 15 
9) 16 16 17 17 17 16 16 15 15 14 13 13 17 17 15 15 
10) Democracy 16 16 17 17 17 16 16 16 15 14 13 13 17 17 16 15 
       Total 157 156 168 169 163 157 157 153 146 135 130 128 167 164 152 148 
Fluctuations in the number of firms available for our study each quarter are mainly due 
to changes in the composition of the index from de-listings, mergers, and bankruptcies. For 
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simplicity reasons, if a firm is de-listed in the middle of a period, its return is calculated as if its 
end-of-period price is equal to its last traded price. The maximum number of firms per quarter 
is 169 and the minimum is 128. There are a sufficient number of data points to be able to draw 
statistical conclusions from the data. 
Stock returns are the primary dependent variable that we use in gauging the impact of 
corporate governance on firm value. As we will see in the following sections, we condition the 
data using commonly used market factors and firm characteristics to ensure there are no 
spurious results nor omitted variable bias. Since we will be testing both short-run and long-run 
relationships with corporate governance, we look at monthly returns as well as three-year 
returns. The summary statistics (correlation, mean, and standard deviation) for relevant 
variables used in our study that relate to short-term stock returns are listed in Table 2. 
Summary statistics for variables related to tests of long-term returns are listed in Table 3. 
Descriptions of the variables can be found in the Appendix. 
Table 2 - Summary Statistics: Short Term Returns and Related Variables 
Panel 1: 
Correlations with 
Monthly Returns 
MRP SMB HML UMD 
1) Dictatorship 0.545 0.328 -0.288 -0.255 
2) 0.815 0.464 -0.19 -0.395 
3) 0.639 0.425 -0.354 -0.32 
4) 0.779 0.434 -0.335 -0.243 
5) 0.792 0.527 -0.189 -0.466 
6) 0.822 0.553 -0.178 -0.364 
7) 0.649 0.344 -0.198 -0.252 
8) 0.789 0.478 -0.118 -0.456 
9) 0.864 0.521 -0.179 -0.337 
10) Democracy 0.824 0.645 -0.367 -0.412 
 
Panel 2: 
Selected Statistics: 
Mean | St. Dev. 
Monthly 
Return 
Factors 
1) Dictatorship -0.0027 | 0.0499 MRP 
-0.0126 | 0.0683 
 
SMB 
-0.0039 | 0.0379 
 
HML 
-0.0115 | 0.0422 
 
UMD 
0.0146 | 0.0376 
 
2) -0.004 | 0.0503 
3) -0.0016 | 0.0588 
4) -0.0151 | 0.0887 
5) -0.0139 | 0.0988 
6) -0.006 | 0.0568 
7) -0.0039 | 0.0539 
8) -0.0031 | 0.0542 
9) -0.0123 | 0.0744 
10) Democracy -0.0034 | 0.0678 
From the above table we can see that the four factors do have moderate to strong 
relationships with the dependent variable, short-term returns. However, there does not appear 
to be a distinct trend when moving from the Dictatorship portfolio to the Democracy portfolio 
for any of the four variables. We can also see that each portfolio exhibits negative returns on 
average due to the selection of time period (2005 – 2008).We will further examine the results 
of a regression analysis in the next section.  
Table 3 - Summary Statistics: Long Term Returns and Related Variables 
Panel 1: 
Correlations with 
3-Year Returns 
G LN(Turnover) SGrowth Yield 
Oct-05 -0.0289 0.1086 -0.0354 0.0437 
Jan-06 -0.0787 0.1118 -0.0791 -0.0401 
Apr-06 -0.1341 0.1816 0.0529 0.0957 
Jul-06 -0.097 0.2509 0.0097 -0.0503 
Oct-06 -0.0916 0.1584 0.1203 -0.1164 
Jan-07 -0.0387 0.1009 0.1231 -0.1122 
Apr-07 -0.036 0.1453 0.0921 -0.1224 
Jul-07 -0.0477 0.1119 0.0228 -0.1002 
 
Panel 2: 
Selected Statistics: 
Mean | St. Dev. 
Return G LN(Turnover) SGrowth Yield 
Oct-05 -0.112 | 0.821 53.75 | 28.432 19.069 | 1.428 1.906 | 8.781 0.012 | 0.015 
Jan-06 -0.38 | 0.935 50.958 | 29.249 18.914 | 1.324 2.041 | 13.452 0.013 | 0.021 
Apr-06 -0.578 | 1.091 50.948 | 29.758 19.177 | 1.289 1.174 | 1.997 0.01 | 0.012 
Jul-06 -0.391 | 0.984 50.646 | 29.951 18.886 | 1.374 4.651 | 36.155 0.012 | 0.018 
Oct-06 -0.277 | 0.948 52.565 | 29.041 18.94 | 1.4 1.478 | 2.557 0.012 | 0.021 
Jan-07 -0.331 | 0.955 52.158 | 29.06 19.027 | 1.282 1.407 | 2.646 0.012 | 0.021 
Apr-07 -0.338 | 0.95 52.704 | 29.533 19.311 | 1.269 1.515 | 3.218 0.014 | 0.024 
Jul-07 -0.434 | 0.905 53.101 | 29.333 19.298 | 1.396 1.792 | 5.446 0.013 | 0.019 
The most important conclusion about the relationship between long-term returns and 
the variables included in the above table is the negative correlation with the corporate 
governance index, although the relationship is rather weak. This suggests that firms with poorer 
corporate governance scores actually outperformed good governance companies. We will delve 
into these relationships further once we run the regressions for all relevant variables in a later 
section. 
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Firm value as measured by Tobin’s Q (Q) is another metric we use to test whether or not 
good governance matters. In order to isolate the portion of Q that can be attributed to 
governance, we condition the data with the same variables used by Shin and Stulz [2000]9 in 
their study on Q. The summary statistics for the relevant variables are listed in Table 4, and the 
descriptions of the variables can be found in the Appendix. 
Table 4 - Summary Statistics – Tobin’s Q and Related Variables 
Panel 1: 
Correlations with 
Tobin’s Q 
G LN(Firm Age) LN(Book Assets) 
Oct-05 -0.0006 -0.1532 -0.4081 
Jan-06 -0.018 -0.1617 -0.3969 
Apr-06 -0.0662 -0.2007 -0.4464 
Jul-06 -0.1519 -0.2015 -0.417 
Oct-06 -0.1317 -0.1924 -0.3949 
Jan-07 -0.122 -0.1703 -0.3858 
Apr-07 -0.1245 -0.1574 -0.3685 
Jul-07 -0.0644 -0.1322 -0.322 
Oct-07 0.1085 -0.1115 -0.3533 
Jan-08 0.1422 -0.1002 -0.253 
Apr-08 0.0424 -0.116 -0.2621 
Jul-08 0.0438 -0.0892 -0.256 
Oct-08 0.1311 -0.151 -0.4233 
Jan-09 0.0597 -0.0752 -0.3443 
Apr-09 0.0498 -0.0902 -0.364 
Jul-09 0.0742 -0.1236 -0.3707 
 
Panel 2: 
Summary Statistics: 
Mean | St. Dev. 
Q G LN(Firm Age) LN(Book Assets) 
Oct-05 1.746 | 0.946 52.647 | 28.286 2.871 | 0.877 8.315 | 1.636 
Jan-06 1.898 | 1.164 50.237 | 29.275 2.902 | 0.851 8.333 | 1.638 
Apr-06 2.101 | 1.479 50.585 | 29.296 2.86 | 0.832 8.174 | 1.692 
Jul-06 1.917 | 1.192 50.63 | 29.576 2.868 | 0.831 8.186 | 1.689 
Oct-06 1.906 | 1.599 52.593 | 29.447 2.87 | 0.803 8.26 | 1.706 
Jan-07 1.976 | 1.647 52.585 | 29.519 2.895 | 0.823 8.395 | 1.678 
Apr-07 1.858 | 1.576 52.394 | 29.807 2.91 | 0.813 8.385 | 1.689 
Jul-07 1.744 | 1.06 52.085 | 30.183 2.928 | 0.8 8.451 | 1.667 
Oct-07 1.73 | 1.027 52.97 | 29.906 2.933 | 0.774 8.524 | 1.679 
Jan-08 1.837 | 1.482 53.392 | 29.222 2.987 | 0.77 8.678 | 1.646 
Apr-08 1.742 | 1.204 53.777 | 29.644 3.029 | 0.75 8.748 | 1.644 
Jul-08 1.658 | 1.064 54.111 | 29.87 3.056 | 0.742 8.836 | 1.617 
Oct-08 1.886 | 2.024 55.996 | 28.524 2.859 | 0.823 8.427 | 1.725 
Jan-09 1.389 | 1.344 57.623 | 28.445 2.819 | 0.833 8.503 | 1.715 
Apr-09 1.389 | 1.288 56.843 | 28.494 2.89 | 0.797 8.56 | 1.759 
Jul-09 1.446 | 1.095 57.298 | 28.736 2.915 | 0.776 8.606 | 1.74 
                                                          
9
 Shin and Stulz 2000  
22 
 
The correlations in the above table yield interesting information about their relationship 
with Q. First, it is seemingly unrelated to governance, though the correlation switches from 
negative to positive in July 2007. We also see that the log of firm age is in fact negatively 
related to Q, when it would have been reasonable to assume that a firm that has been in 
existence longer may have a greater separation between market value of assets and their 
replacement cost. For thoroughness, we also found that the correlation is also negative when 
firm age is not in logs. The log of book value of assets is negatively correlated with Q, which is 
not surprising considering its non-log value is the denominator of Q. We will revisit these 
relationships in regression form in a later section. 
We have chosen to use Canadian data only, for a couple of reasons. Firstly, there has 
been large interest in this field during the past decade in the United States. The 
disproportionate amount of research done in this field compared with Canada was our primary 
consideration. Canadian and US markets are highly integrated and conducting research on 
Canadian firms was deemed appropriate.  Lastly, while similar to the previous reason, American 
markets are analyzed more than any other in the world; therefore the opportunity for 
abnormal returns (alpha) is very minute. It is not to say the Canadian markets are immature by 
continuous mispricing of securities; however it can be noted that alpha situations may appear 
more frequently with less analysis by sophisticated investors.  
Corporate Governance and Short-Term Returns (Regression 1) 
Companies with good corporate governance should create more value for shareholders 
when compared to those with poor corporate governance. To test this notion, we look at the 
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monthly returns on ten equally sized portfolios grouped based on their corporate governance 
ranking. The portfolio returns are value-weighted based on market capitalization on individual 
companies. We dub the portfolios in the lowest and highest decile of the corporate governance 
index the Dictatorship and Democracy portfolios, respectively.  
Researchers have traditionally dissected returns on individual firms or portfolios based 
on their style, with common characteristics found to impact returns being: the firm’s exposure 
to the market risk premium (“beta”); the firm’s market capitalization (“size”); the market value 
of the firm’s equity relative to its book value (“book-to-market”); and the firm’s immediate past 
returns (“momentum”). Although there have been a number of criticisms as to whether these 
differences in portfolio style do have a statistically significant influence on returns, we take no 
explicit position on the issue and simply use the four-factor model as a method of performance 
attribution, similar to [Gompers et al.]10. If the return on the Dictatorship Portfolio differs 
significantly from the Democracy Portfolio, then part of this difference should be accounted for 
by differences in style. 
We use the time-series four-factor model proposed by Carhart [1997]11: 
                                     
where Rt is the monthly return on the asset in excess of the risk-free return; MRPt is the 
monthly return on the market portfolio in excess of the risk-free return; and SMBt, HMLt, and 
UMDt are the monthly returns on value-weighted, zero-investment, factor-mimicking portfolios 
for size (small minus big), book-to-market value (high minus low), and momentum of stock 
                                                          
10
 Gompers, Ishii, Metrick  2003 
11
 Carhart 1997 
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returns (up minus down). These factors are specific to Canadian firms and have been kindly 
provided by Professor Francouer who follows the same methodology as Kenneth French in 
calculating the factors. The intercept coefficient “α” is interpreted as the abnormal return that 
could be achieved with passive investment in the four above-listed factors. If corporate 
governance matters, then the alpha of portfolios with higher corporate governance scores 
should be higher than those with lower scores. 
We run one Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression for a long position in each 
individual decile of the corporate governance index, and one regression for a long position in 
the Democracy Portfolio combined with a short position in the Dictatorship Portfolio. We 
update the constituents of each decile on a quarterly basis due to the availability of the data. 
The results of the regression are in Table 5. T-stats are in parentheses. 
Table 5 – Performance Attribution Regressions for Decile Portfolios 
Portfolio Decile α MRP SMB HML UMD 
1) Dictatorship -0.0011 
(-0.1466) 
0.4914 
(3.5179) 
-0.5472 
(-1.7668) 
-0.3970 
(-2.14179) 
-0.3523 
(-1.5455) 
2) 0.0030 
(0.6496) 
0.7426 
(8.3111) 
-0.6532 
(-3.2969) 
-0.2416 
(-2.0377) 
-0.4087 
(-2.8021) 
3) 0.0017 
(0.2200) 
0.6301 
(4.3684) 
-0.6291 
(-1.9669) 
-0.5453 
(-2.8486) 
-0.4829 
(-2.0508) 
4) -0.0085 
(-0.9695) 
1.2922 
(7.6446) 
-1.1471 
(-3.0603) 
-0.7027 
(-3.1329) 
-0.4038 
(-1.4633) 
5) 0.0039 
(0.3861) 
1.2587 
(6.5245) 
-0.8950 
(-2.09215) 
-0.4202 
(-1.6413) 
-0.9074 
(-2.8816) 
6) 0.0010 
(0.1721) 
0.7288 
(6.4252) 
-0.2667 
(-1.0602) 
-0.1117 
(-0.7420) 
-0.2155 
(-1.1641) 
7) 0.0001 
(0.0101) 
0.6659 
(4.8268) 
-0.6279 
(-2.0527) 
-0.2727 
(-1.4895) 
-0.2843 
(-1.2626) 
8) 0.0063 
(1.1528) 
0.7352 
(6.9991) 
-0.5851 
(-2.5123) 
-0.1568 
(-1.1247) 
-0.4955 
(-2.8898) 
9) -0.0020 
(-0.2961) 
1.1037 
(8.7477) 
-0.6148 
(-2.1977) 
-0.1880 
(-1.1229) 
-0.2733 
(-1.3271) 
10) Democracy 0.0030 
(0.4729) 
0.7680 
(6.3031) 
-0.2347 
(-0.8687) 
-0.4575 
(-2.8295) 
-0.4077 
(-2.0499) 
Democracy - Dictatorship 0.0011 
(0.1347) 
0.2718 
(1.7304) 
0.3185 
(0.9145) 
-0.0604 
(-0.2900) 
-0.0588 
(-0.2294) 
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Interpretations Regression 1 
With none of the portfolios exhibiting a statistically significant abnormal return in this 
time-series regression, we cannot conclude that holding a strong corporate governance 
portfolio during the sample period will outperform a weak corporate governance portfolio. 
Therefore, we cannot suggest that governance provisions cause higher agency costs – as 
predicted in Hypothesis 1. Our results mirror the aggregate of all available conclusions on this 
topic – ambiguity.  
  Even in an economic sense, there does not appear to be any correlation between 
abnormal returns and level of corporate governance. As will be discussed in a later section, this 
suggests that differences in corporate governance are already priced into the securities being 
tested.  
Since we did not find statistical significance with the corporate governance variable, it 
would be prudent to run similar regressions before we condition the data for the four factors 
(namely market risk premium, size, book-to-market value, and momentum). We do find similar 
results with no statistical significance when using market risk premium as the only independent 
variable on the same data grouped into 11 portfolios (one for each decile and one for a long 
position in the democracy portfolio and a short position in the dictatorship portfolio). This 
regression is also known as the Capital Asset Pricing Model. 
Additionally, the results found during the 1990’s could have been a case of sample 
period bias, such that abnormal returns in favour of the Democracy group can only found in this 
small time period. Lastly, in accordance with previous comments, we argue that because this 
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topic has been analyzed, at least in the United States, for quite some time the level of 
governance is already priced into the security. Correspondingly, our results of not achieving 
statistical significant abnormal returns are perfectly valid.  
Corporate Governance and Firm Value (Regression 2) 
In this section we examine whether there is a relationship between our corporate 
governance index and firm value as measured by Tobin’s Q (Q). Q is a measure of market value 
of assets to book value of assets and is a relative measure that is comparable among firms of 
different sizes. A value for Q of greater than 1 implies that the market sees more value in the 
firm’s assets than their replacement cost, which is highly desired by shareholders as opposed to 
the alternative. Besides the fact that Q was used by Gompers et al, we feel it is a superior 
measure of relative firm value to other measures such as price-to-book or price-to-earnings for 
a number of reasons: it incorporates the value of the firm’s debt; it is not a backward looking 
measure like price-to-earnings is; and in theory, replacement cost of assets is more appropriate 
than historical cost. There has also been some criticism of Q, specifically that it is not consistent 
between periods with different inflation levels. 
Although there are many variations of the traditional Tobin’s Q measure, we follow the 
method of Kaplan and Zingales [1997]12 as described above. Since the value of Q can vary 
significantly between industries, we follow Gompers, Ishii and Metrick [2003]13 and run 
regressions for both firm Q and industry-adjusted Q, which is calculated as firm Q minus 
industry-median Q for the ten industries classified by Global Industry Classification Standard 
                                                          
12
 Kaplan and Zingales 1997 
13
 Gompers, Ishii, Metrick 2003 
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(GICS). As controls for the relationship between Q and corporate governance, we add a vector 
of firm characteristics which includes the log of firm age as measured by the IPO date and the 
log of total assets, the same characteristics used by Shin and Stulz [2000]14 in their test of Q. 
After making the necessary adjustments and selecting the appropriate variables, we regress: 
                               
where Q is firm Q or industry-adjusted Q, G is the corporate governance variable, Age is the log 
of firm age in years, and Assets is the log of book value of assets. The intuition behind including 
firm age in the regression is that we would expect firms with longer histories to have built up 
their levels of intangible assets in excess of their replacement cost to a greater degree than 
firms with shorter histories. The book value of assets accounts for the size effect, which has 
been the focus of many studies to determine if returns and relative valuations are related to 
the market capitalization of a firm. We run cross-sectional regressions for each quarter 
between October 2005 and July 2009 inclusive. The number of firms in each cross-sectional 
regression varies between 125 and 163 based on the availability of data. If corporate 
governance does in fact have an impact on firm value, we would expect to see a positive and 
statistically significant coefficient for   . The results of the two sets of regressions are in Table 6 
for firm Q and Table 7 for industry-adjusted Q. T-Stats are in parentheses.  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
14
 Shin and Stulz 2000 
Table 6 - Firm Q and Corporate Governance 
Quarter α G Age Assets 
Oct-05 3.741  
(9.0197) 
0.0008  
(0.3258) 
-0.0448  
(-0.5142) 
-0.2297  
(-4.9392) 
Jan-06 4.3265 
 (8.5661) 
0.0006  
(0.2041) 
-0.0649  
(-0.5866) 
-0.2727  
(-4.7674) 
Apr-06 5.4798 
 (9.5964) 
-0.0011 
 (-0.3046) 
-0.0981  
(-0.727) 
-0.3721 
 (-5.6167) 
Jul-06 4.5094  
(9.8876) 
-0.0032 
 (-1.0889) 
-0.0706  
(-0.635) 
-0.2721  
(-4.945) 
Oct-06 5.2783  
(7.9827) 
-0.0041  
(-0.9819) 
-0.1251  
(-0.7739) 
-0.3388  
(-4.4074) 
Jan-07 5.4006  
(7.761) 
-0.0034  
(-0.7846) 
-0.0937 
 (-0.5814) 
-0.3544  
(-4.4475) 
Apr-07 4.9599  
(7.4487) 
-0.0033 
 (-0.8038) 
-0.0803  
(-0.515) 
-0.3214  
(-4.2308) 
Jul-07 3.5303  
(7.459) 
0.0004 
 (0.1234) 
-0.0389  
(-0.3483) 
-0.2  
(-3.6347) 
Oct-07 3.4404  
(6.643) 
0.0015 
(0.5215) 
0.0068  
(0.0591) 
-0.2122  
(-3.9535) 
Jan-08 3.4773  
(4.2623) 
0.0052  
(1.169) 
-0.0484  
(-0.2774) 
-0.2042 
 (-2.4589) 
Apr-08 3.381  
(5.3531) 
0.003 
(0.8507) 
-0.0375  
(-0.2536) 
-0.1929 
 (-2.8383) 
Jul-08 3.0551  
(5.234) 
0.0026 
 (0.8371) 
-0.0006 
 (-0.0048) 
-0.174 
 (-2.8307) 
Oct-08 5.4091  
(6.4973) 
0.0089  
(1.7392) 
0.1028 
 (0.5326) 
-0.5121 
 (-5.6255) 
Jan-09 3.3193 
 (5.6769) 
0.0029 
(0.7997) 
0.1909  
(1.3785) 
-0.3098 
(-4.6855) 
Apr-09 3.3329  
(5.7606) 
0.0023  
(0.646) 
0.1675  
(1.1782) 
-0.2989 
 (-4.7324) 
Jul-09 3.1738  
(6.2587) 
0.0028  
(0.9171) 
0.0865  
(0.6937) 
-0.2486  
(-4.5454) 
 
Table 7 - Industry-Adj. Q and Corporate Governance 
Quarter α G Age Assets 
Oct-05 1.6126  
(3.9167) 
-0.0007 
 (-0.2638) 
0.0106 
 (0.1229) 
-0.1727 
 (-3.7399) 
Jan-06 2.1552  
(4.4723) 
-0.0012 
 (-0.4219) 
-0.0409 
 (-0.388) 
-0.2025 
 (-3.7101) 
Apr-06 3.0696  
(5.5388) 
-0.0032 
 (-0.9005) 
-0.1085 
 (-0.8283) 
-0.2718 
 (-4.2272) 
Jul-06 2.2859  
(5.168) 
-0.0048 
 (-1.6755) 
-0.0641 
 (-0.5939) 
-0.1919 
 (-3.5959) 
Oct-06 3.1683  
(4.7709) 
-0.0048  
(-1.1472) 
-0.1413 
 (-0.8704) 
-0.2669 
 (-3.4568) 
Jan-07 3.1898  
(4.5801) 
-0.0045 
 (-1.0331) 
-0.1285 
 (-0.7968) 
-0.266 
 (-3.3349) 
Apr-07 2.9516 
 (4.4483) 
-0.0038  
(-0.9251) 
-0.0879 
 (-0.5657) 
-0.2574 
 (-3.3997) 
Jul-07 1.4418  
(3.0962) 
0.0002  
(0.0847) 
-0.0231 
 (-0.2109) 
-0.1339 
 (-2.4736) 
Oct-07 1.321  
(2.5866) 
0.0011 
 (0.394) 
0.0341 
 (0.3026) 
-0.1468  
(-2.7734) 
Jan-08 1.4561  
(1.8094) 
0.004 
 (0.9131) 
-0.0408 
 (-0.237) 
-0.1364 
 (-1.6656) 
Apr-08 1.4059  
(2.248) 
0.0022  
(0.6331) 
-0.0461 
 (-0.3146) 
-0.1224 
 (-1.8186) 
Jul-08 1.1294  
(1.9633) 
0.0022  
 (0.699) 
-0.0052 
 (-0.0395) 
-0.1088 
 (-1.7953) 
Oct-08 3.609 
 (4.3262) 
0.0074  
(1.4474) 
0.0957 
 (0.4948) 
-0.4514 
 (-4.9489) 
Jan-09 2.0781  
(3.5525) 
0.0029 
 (0.8019) 
0.1722 
 (1.2432) 
-0.2894 
 (-4.3761) 
Apr-09 2.0722 
 (3.5812) 
0.002 
 (0.5585) 
0.1566 
 (1.1012) 
-0.2788 
 (-4.4135) 
Jul-09 1.5876  
(3.161) 
0.0021  
(0.6846) 
0.1089 
 (0.8821) 
-0.2099 
 (-3.8742) 
Interpretations Regression 2 
We find that the only variable with statistical significance in both sets of regressions is 
the log of book value of assets, whose non-log value is also the denominator in the calculation 
of Q. We cannot draw any conclusions about the relationship between corporate governance 
and firm value in either set of regressions other than the fact that there is a shift from negative 
to positive coefficients in July 2007 for the industry-adjusted Q regressions. This trend may 
have economic meaning but is not statistically significant. Therefore, we cannot suggest that 
governance provisions cause lower firm value – as predicted in Hypothesis 2. These results 
29 
 
suggest that at any given time, the value of a firm’s assets as perceived by the market either has 
no relation to corporate governance levels or this relation has already been priced in by market 
participants. 
Corporate Governance and Long-Term Returns (Regression 3) 
Having already examined the relationship between changes in firm value and corporate 
governance on a short-term basis, we now turn our attention towards long-term performance. 
A firm that ranks in the highest decile in terms of corporate governance is said to be 
implementing processes aimed at maximizing value creation for the benefit of shareholders. 
The effects of good corporate governance may be more prominent in the long run when we 
ignore interim volatility and firm-specific events (unsystematic risk).  
In a modification of the method used by Gompers, Ishii and Metrick [2003]15 for 
attributing stock returns to various business characteristics, we look at three-year stock returns 
as our dependent variable with the following cross-section regression over eight quarters from 
October 2005 through July 2007: 
                                           
where R is the three-year return on the stock adjusted for dividends, G is the corporate 
governance variable, Turnover is the dollar trading volume for the stock in the month preceding 
the regression, SGrowth is the growth in sales over the preceding three years, and Yield is the 
dividend yield on the stock based on the latest year of dividend payouts. We feel the partial 
correlations with these variables and long-run returns make their inclusion appropriate. 
                                                          
15
 Gompers, Ishii and Metrick 2003 
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Gompers et al. included firm size as measured by market capitalization in the above equation, 
as well as some variables exclusive to US markets (such as S&P 500 inclusion). Seeing as 
Turnover and Size are highly correlated (average correlation is 0.813 over the eight quarters), 
including this extra variable would create significant multicollinearity in the regression. The 
effect of this characteristic would be for the coefficients to be inaccurate, although the overall 
statistical significance of the model as measured by the F-statistic would not be affected. The 
number of firms in each of the eight cross-sectional regressions varies between 98 and 139 
based on the availability of data. If corporate governance does have an impact on long-run 
stock returns, we would expect to see a positive and statistically significant coefficient for   . 
The results of the regressions are listed in Table 8. T-Stats are in parentheses. 
Table 8 - Long-Run Stock Return and Corporate Governance 
Quarter α G Turnover SGrowth Yield 
Oct-05 -1.287 
(-1.346) 
-0.0016 
(-0.6168) 
0.0651 
(1.2674) 
0 
(-0.2104) 
1.709 
(0.3705) 
Jan-06 -2.0756 
(-1.5614) 
-0.0032 
(-1.0053) 
0.1004 
(1.3946) 
0 
(-0.5882) 
-2.7136 
(-0.6085) 
Apr-06 -3.5682 
(-2.3107) 
-0.0063 
(-1.8045) 
0.169 
(2.043) 
0.0196 
(0.3829) 
4.9097 
(0.5766) 
Jul-06 -4.1874 
(-3.3068) 
-0.0055 
(-1.7682) 
0.2187 
(3.1915) 
0.0016 
(0.6385) 
-5.4619 
(-1.098) 
Oct-06 -2.339 
(-1.8612) 
-0.0032 
(-0.9738) 
0.1193 
(1.7947) 
0.0318 
(0.8541) 
-6.1788 
(-1.3903) 
Jan-07 -1.7756 
(-1.2417) 
-0.0019 
(-0.563) 
0.0825 
(1.0728) 
0.0342 
(0.9206) 
-5.8291 
(-1.2335) 
Apr-07 -2.4639 
(-1.6821) 
-0.0026 
(-0.7752) 
0.1198 
(1.5419) 
0.0184 
(0.6103) 
-5.5937 
(-1.3854) 
Jul-07 -2.0022 
(-1.5398) 
-0.0026 
(-0.7688) 
0.0919 
(1.3191) 
-0.0011 
(-0.0604) 
-5.0054 
(-1.0428) 
31 
 
Interpretations Regression 3 
The output of the regression suggests no statistically significant relationship exists 
between long-run returns and any of the random variables. Therefore, we cannot suggest that 
large amounts of governance provisions affect returns in the long-run – as tested for in 
Hypothesis 3.  Of even greater surprise is the recurrence of negative coefficients on the 
corporate governance variable, which although are not statistically significant, do indicate that 
there is a tendency for firms with lower corporate governance scores to outperform the 
alternative in an economic sense in the long run. Holding all other variables constant, this does 
seem to suggest that investors that forego some of their rights are compensated with higher 
returns in the long run. 
Limitations and Recommended Further Research 
The most significant limitation in our research was the availability of Canadian data for 
the past decade. In hindsight we were forced into using a time horizon that was shorter than 
we would have liked. However, in order to accommodate for this timeframe we would have 
had to build an index similar to Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick [2003]. Generating a new index, in 
our opinion, would take away from levels of comparability. While research on corporate 
governance is relatively new in Canada – by creating our own index instead of using a readily 
available one would restrict further research in this area. The consequence is that we were 
limited to the time period used in our study. 
The second limitation was the lack of using absolute scoring when characterizing the 
securities into the different groups. Instead, we followed the generally accepted usage of 
relative rankings. Without knowing the absolute severity of the governance for the Democracy 
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or Dictator groups – we are subject to some form of data skewness. Utilizing relative rankings 
defends us against subjective biases. Determining the absolute score would require making 
decisions outside of simply inputting parameters, therefore allowing the entrance of 
subjectivity. We feel that the limitations of relative rankings outweigh the strengths of absolute 
scoring.  
The third limitation involves the nature of our time period. Due to the extremes 
regarding the lead up to the peak in 2007 until the bottoming of the 2008 recession, our data 
will suffer from not being part of a ‘typical’ cycle. The catalyst behind the volatility – fear – is 
very difficult to quantify; therefore adjusting for this factor cannot be done.   
After reviewing governance literature in both Canada and the United States, we have 
mixed results regarding governance as a driver for returns. All literature we have come across, 
regardless of the conclusion, use some form of relative ranking. Setting aside personal views, 
we think it would be a positive exercise for researchers to create an absolute scoring study. This 
would serve two distinct purposes. Firstly, our research accepts the limitation of possible 
skewness, therefore by calculating an absolute platform, you would be able to have an idea of 
just how much skewness exists. Secondly, by calculating an absolute score, you would be able 
to put to rest any counter-arguments to relative rankings; or pending positive results have a 
first-movers advantage into a new research field.  
Lastly, the challenge of using a governance index is that this can be vastly different from 
the way that firms actually carry about their practices. Therefore, from this perspective 
governance scores can be irrelevant. In order to get around this, researchers could look at how 
firms depict their governance provisions and how they handle them in reality. Unfortunately, 
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the difficulty that resides in this process comes from management’s reliability in hiding what 
they don’t want the public to see. In turn, ‘bad’ behaviour is usually only transparent after the 
fact. 
Conclusion  
 Our project’s intention was to add depth to the literature on corporate governance in 
Canada, and in turn hopefully provide a set of results that would provide some clarity in an 
otherwise ambiguous setting. While, we lack statistical significance in all of our hypotheses - we 
do caution investors. Our third hypothesis had a sub-argument related to the riskiness of the 
Dictator group; while there was some evidence to move against our thoughts, there was little in 
the form of conclusive results. Therefore we maintain our position that the Dictator group is 
riskier, and in turn would require a higher than expected return in order to invest in these 
securities.  
 The separation between shareholders and management has become very clear. What 
needs to continue is transparency on behalf of management. In a perfect investing 
environment, management would clearly state their intentions, and through the market place 
the security would be priced. In reality it is not that simple. Even in this study, we deferred 
quantifying the significance of management’s intentions in favour of a ranking system. 
Therefore, cautious use of intuition needs to be placed with investors.  
 After all is said and done, we continued to demonstrate the complexity of corporate 
governance in the current investment environment. In terms of what we take out of this project 
is that corporate governance aligned with shareholders is a form of insurance. You may not see 
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any of the day to day benefits, but it does allow you to sleep knowing that management is 
determined to maximize shareholders value. To us that is better than trying to figure out what 
management may or may not be doing. We can leave the reader with one final comment and 
that is when evaluating the investment potential of a company, as simple as it may sound, don’t 
forget to analyze the corporate governance. If you are going to give up control, than at least 
choose a security that will compensate you for it.  
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Appendix  
 
Corporate Governance Quotient (G). The relative ranking of index members from 0.1 to 100 
based on corporate governance criteria. 
The following three factors are based off of the Fama-French Canadian Factors.16 
Market Risk Premium (MRP). The average market return minus the 90 day Canadian Treasury 
Bill (T-Bill) rate. 
High Minus Low (HML). The average return on a portfolio of value stocks minus the average 
return on a portfolio of growth stocks. The value portfolios are characterized by a high book to 
market ratio. Conversely, the growth portfolios are characterized by a low book to market ratio. 
Small Minus Big (SMB). The average return on a portfolio of small stocks minus the average return on 
a portfolio of large stocks. Fama-French originally created 6 portfolios and divided them into the two 
groups based on the firm’s size. 
The following Factor is based off of the Carhart Momentum Factor17 
Momentum – Up Minus Down (UMD). According to Chi-Hsiou Hung “the average monthly returns 
difference between the returns on the high and low prior return portfolio”18  
Tobin’s Q (Q). “The market value of assets divided by the book value of assets19.” In order to calculate 
market value of assets you take the sum of the market capitalization and book value of liabilities. Tobin’s 
Q is used to determine a firm’s value.  
                                                          
16
 Francoeur (2010) and Fama & French (2010) 
17
 Carhart (1997) 
18
 Hung (2006) 
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Turnover. The dollar trading volume over one month. 
3-Year Sales Growth (SGrwoth). The growth in gross sales over the previous three years. 
Firm Age (Age). The age of the firm in years since the firm's initial public offering. 
Dividend Yield (Yield). Total dividend payments per share made in the previous year as a percentage 
of current stock price. 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
19
 Gompers, Ishii & Metrick (2003) 
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